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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
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CRISTIN J. BICKEL,
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SUPREME COURT NO: 43323
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Defendant/Appellant.
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This

is based upon the findings of the trial court,

j

Thomas Borresen presiding, and the affirmation of that opinion by the Honorable Randy
J. Stoker.
The issue at trial was whether or not the Appellant had violated the Court's
Decree of Divorce dated April 14, 2011 during the month of May, 2014.
The first two counts of the Motion for Contempt deal specifically with weekends in
the month of May, 2014 wherein the Appellant denied the Respondent proper visitation.
As the Decree was quite involved relative to the visitation, the pleadings in the contempt
were actually in the alternative, although not so stated. That was subsequently clarified
to the court, with no objection from the Appellant.
The final count, dealt with utilization of the wrong exchange location, and was
withdrawn. No evidence was presented on that matter.

11.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
a.

Whether the Magistrate erred by finding the Appellant guilty of willful

contempt for following a reasonable construction of the Decree of Divorce that differed
from the Respondent's and subsequently ordering attorney fees based on the error.
b.

Whether the Magistrate abused his discretion in finding Appellant guilty of

a charge that was not alleged by Respondent.
c.

Whether the Magistrate abused his discretion in sentencing the Appellant

unjustly as an example to both parties since the Court is tired of this case.
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I .

relative

a.

matters at

deal with

paragraphs 2 and 3 of the April 14, 2011 Decree. At the hearing, it was agreed that the
first weekend of May was the Respondent's weekend for visitation. The second
weekend of May would be the Respondent's time as it was Mother's day and she was
entitled to the weekend. The issue arises regarding the third and fourth weekends in
May. The Respondent asserted that she agreed to forgo what would have been her
alternating weekend, the third weekend of May, at the Appellant's request, and in
exchange she would receive the fourth weekend in May. Unfortunately, the Appellant
refused/failed to present the child for visitation on either the third or fourth weekend of
May.
b.

Pursuant to paragraph two of the Decree of Divorce, the Appellant had

residential custody of the child. While paragraph two of the Decree is quite lengthy, the
pertinent section is as follows:
For the 2011 year, the parties will adjust the schedule to insure
that the Mother's weekend includes Mother's day and her
wedding day on May 13, 2011. The parties may vary this
schedule by joint written agreement, however, if the parties
cannot agree upon on a variance, the above-stated schedule
should be followed. The exchange of the minor child shall
continue to take place on Sundays at 4:00 p.m ..
Paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce was altered by paragraph 3. Paragraph 3
dealt with a change in schedule when the minor child entered Kindergarten. There was
no dispute at hearing that the minor child was of school age. Paragraph 3 states in
pertinent part:

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 5

modified as follows:
and the mother
custodial access
during
months, on alternating weekends from
afternoon at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. The Mother
shall have Mother's Day weekend every year with the minor
child and the Father shall have Father's Day weekend every
year with the minor child ...
Both paragraphs refer specifically to Mother's Day weekend. Paragraph 3 did
modify visitation relative to other issues as well.
However, the important portion is that paragraph 2 had language that did not
appear in paragraph 3, i.e.:
With respect to these holidays, the parties will adjust the weekly
schedules in order to assure that the holiday falls during the
appropriate parent's custodial access time.
That sentence specifically refers to the holidays covered in the first half of
paragraph 2. The Mother's Day section follows below that portion and includes
Mother's week to include Mother's Day and her wedding on May 13, 2011.
Paragraph 3 does not have the sentence regarding the adjusting of the weekly
schedules.
The Appellant appears to rely upon paragraph 2 regarding the adjustment of
visitation to also apply to paragraph 3.
In May of 2014, there was no argument that the first weekend was the
Respondent's regularly scheduled alternating weekend. The following weekend
involved Mother's Day, to which the Appellant was entitled to as per paragraph 3 of the
Decree. The Appellant had Mother's Day visitation.
During the early portion of May, Appellant contacted his attorney and requested
that he be granted the third weekend in May, to prohibit the Respondent from having
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The Appellant was permitted the third weekend of May. He then asserted that
based upon alternating weekends, he would be entitled to the last weekend of May. In
that fashion, the Appellant attempted to make arrangements with the Petitioner so he
would have two weekends in a row and she would have had two weekends in a row.
Respondent advised counsel that she was willing to provide the Appellant with
the third weekend provided that she received the following weekend. The Respondent
asserts that no such agreement existed, he was simply entitled to both weekends.
Judge Borresen's determination that the oral modification was enforceable,
determined that the Appellant violated the Decree by refusing to grant the Respondent
visitation on the fourth weekend of May.
!V.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
Judge Stoker's analysis indicated that as no alteration to visitation was
performed in writing, the third weekend in May rightfully belonged to the Respondent
and the Appellant' failure to provide the child for that visitation constituted the contempt.
Apparently, it was appropriate for the matter to be viewed as a pleading in the
alternative, as if the court enforced the strict language of the Decree, the violation of the
order occurred on the third weekend of May. Whereas if the court looked behind the
strictures of the document and allowed the oral agreement to stand, the violation would
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
When an Appellant court reviews the findings of a Magistrate court, the test is
whether or not the trial court's findings were based on substantial and competent,
though conflicting evidence. Hawkins v. Hawkins 99 Idaho 785, 5890 P. 2nd 532 (1978);
Reuth V. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P. 2nd 1333 (1982). Additional authority relative to the

standard of the Appellate Court's review may be located in the District Courts Appellate
Memorandum on page 4.
There was very little factual dispute in this matter as far as the finding of
contempt itself went. The parties both agreed that the Decree of Divorce filed April 14,
2011 was the controlling document. Both parties agreed that the child was enrolled in
Kindergarten or a level thereafter. Everyone agreed that the first two weekends of the
month were properly exercised by the mother. All parties agreed that the child was not
provided by the father on either the third or fourth weekend. The issue before the court
was the interpretation of paragraphs two and three.
Judge Borresen made his determination as to the violation of the previous order
as set forth on pages 66 and 67 of the July 11, 2014 transcript. Paragraph 3 of the
Decree specifically states that the mother should have Mother's Day every year and the
father should have Father's day every year with the minor child. There is no adjustment
language set forth in paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 is the operative paragraph relative to
this matter because the child was of school age when this matter arose. Judge
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indicated

as neither
3.

would

a written
agreement was

visitation, which did not occur, therein lies the contempt. Page

as
L 17 to page 64 L 15

and page 66 L 3 to page 67 L 6.
Judge Stoked framed the issue as to whether or not the modification was in
writing. He never got to the issue of the weekend trade arrangement. A simple reading
of paragraph 3, states that the mother shall have alternating weekends, the mother shall
have Mother's Day weekend, and any modifications were to be made in writing. As
there was no modification made in writing, the contempt took place.
Under either of the foregoing analysis, it is clear that both judges had substantial
and competent evidence placed before them to justify their findings that the conduct of
the father was wrongful, willful and therefore contemptible.
The argument of the father must be taken into consideration. It was his position,
that paragraph 2 did not have an expiration date. It was his posture that there was
always to be adjustments so that the visitation on holidays would occur on that parties
weekends. In order to accomplish the results which occurred, apparently, Mr. Bickel
requested to combine the contents of paragraph 2 and 3 into one paragraph with a
smorgasbord of options. His position appears to be that since Mother's Day fell on his
weekend, it was the mother's obligation to make the weekly adjusted schedule in order
to insure that his visitation was uninterrupted. In essence, pursuant to paragraph 2, she
had the obligation to correct her visitation in his favor. Having not done that, it is his
position that she had two weeks in a row, then he was entitled to have two weeks in a
row, and thereafter back to the alternating weekends. Accordingly, he had every right to
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as

. And in

that scheduling

mind

accomplish two weekends for her and two weekends for him.

VI.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The problem is, paragraph 2 is expired. Paragraph 3 does not authorize the
adjustments, unless they are made in writing. Further, the adjustments are voluntary
not mandatory as per paragraph 2. It is the tortured explanation of Mr. Bickel
attempting to utilize an expired provision of the Decree to justify his conduct.
Additionally, there was testimony that the agreement was made between the attorneys'
offices, and presumably passed onto the client. Mr. Bickel asserts that he was never
informed of such a situation by his attorney, and that his attorney had no authority to
make such an agreement. Accordingly, Mr. Bickel asserts that he is being held
criminally liable for the actions of his attorney.
A.

Pertinent Provisions Interpretation

Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that under any of the three theories set forth
by Judge Borresen, Judge Stoker, or the Respondent, a violation of visitation did in fact
take place. At that juncture, the Appellant's defense is that any such conduct was not
willful.
B.

The Act Was Willful

Willful is defined in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 340. That is a definition
a jury to consider when determining whether or
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a crime has a been committed It
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the

the J

It is

making

determination is

aware

what is

was

know or intend to violate the terms of the custody order. However, the definition itself
takes care of that:
An act or a failure to act is "willful" or done "willfully" when done
on purpose. One can act willfully without intending to violate the
law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
Further, the comment to the instructions states:
Idaho Code Section 18-101 (1 ). The word "willfully", when
applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted,
implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or
make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to
violate the law, or injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
Without belaboring the point, it is rather clear that willful violation of the custody
arrangements, simply indicated that one must make an election to either grant or deny
visitation

It is not a determination as to whether or not the perpetrator intended to

violate the provision of custody, but merely whether or not he intended to commit the act
that did violate the terms of visitation.
As such, there is little or no doubt that the Appellant's conduct was in fact willful.
C.

Sentencing

The primary concern regarding sentencing is that it was unduly harsh for several
reasons.
The Appellant was sentenced to 5 days incarceration with 2 suspended and 3 to
serve, no fine was awarded. Terms of serving that sentence were very amenable to the
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Appellant seems

as to the

the sentence:
1. The sentence as adjudged impacts him far more than anyone else, in view
of his need to maintain professional dignity.
2. The sentence imposed is unduly harsh as a warning to both him and the
Respondent.
Dealing with the first issue. The sentence is unduly harsh in that as an IT tech he
works for Fortune 500 companies. It is his concern that such a conviction on his record
would cause him to lose his security status through various companies who perform on
behalf of the Department of Defense. It would also impair his future marketability with
other governmental agencies and publicly held companies.
By the same token, if a party has so much to lose, their conduct must be much
more circumspect. The fact that they have marketable and professional skills should
help them avoid such conduct. He elected to gamble on being right, he failed, so be it.
Idaho Code§ 19-2521 sets forth a criteria for placing an individual on probation
or imposing imprisonment. That statute requires the court to consider the nature and
circumstances of the crime and the history character and condition of the Defendant.
The court must also determine whether imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the
public, concerning 6 specific factors. The vast majority of those specified concerns are
not applicable in this particular case, or probably in any contempt sentencing matter.
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Subpart C deals

fear

a

sentence

the seriousness

of the conduct. That is appropriate in this case, as missed visitation can never be truly
regained. The time for that visitation has come and gone. Whatever may have
occurred during that period of time regarding bonding, educational benefits, or simply
deepening the appreciation between parent and child cannot necessarily be made up by
simply giving additional time, the time was then, not potential in the future. The court
clearly detected an attitude of confrontation between the parties and an inability of the
parties to coexist peacefully. This sentence, certainly will make the Appellant question
his conduct and perhaps attempt to result in conduct more conducive to raising the child
as apposed to continually being at war.
Dealing with sections D and E, incarceration albeit for a very short term, i.e. 3
days, will act as a deterrent not only to the Appellant, but toward the Respondent as
well. The Appellant's appreciation of Judge Borresen's comment that the orders could
be thrown away, indicates an unwillingness to accept the fact that there are issues at
play. The court's comment dealt specifically with the parties treating each other with
mutual respect and admiration. As the court alludes to the fact it appears as though a
mutual exchange point from Boise to Jerome will obviously in a necessity take place.
Additionally, the court was flabbergasted by the Appellant's refusal/unwillingness to
advise Respondent when he moved to Boise.
The court's commentary indicates that the issues between the parties are
multifaceted, and of a wide variance regarding seriousness.
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the court's orders and adherence

them. The court

clearly was making an example of the Appellant for that purpose, and specifically told
Respondent that she too needed to mend her ways, if needed. A sentence of 3 days in
the county jail should alert both parties these rules exist. They violate court orders at
the own risk, Respondent acknowledges her understanding of the price of contentions,
hopefully the Appellant will too.
Statute 19-25-21 (2) sets forth factors in order to avoid a sentence. Those factors,
rapidly indicate that in this instance, they do not militate against a jail sentence.
The Appellant's conduct caused harm. Respondent missed visitation time with
the child.
The Appellant should have contemplated harm would result. Obviously, lost
visitation is lost visitation.
There was no strong provocation for the Appellant to refuse to comply with the
terms of the agreement or the terms of the Decree. It is posited that in June, Father's
Day, a similar issue would arise in his favor.
Additionally, the conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to occur is
directly related to the character and attitude of the Appellant. As indicated by Judge
Borresen, simple issues such as a midpoint exchange appeared as though it was going
to require additional litigation. The likelihood of further problems coming forth, was high.
Especially as the Appellant points out, this has been a solid, continual case since 2009.
This sentence did not exceed the maximum potential sentence for contempt.
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Respondent

filed

a request for

fees in

amount

$1

The court, awarded attorney fees in the amount of $1,400.00. It would appear that the
Appellant simply declines to admit that the Respondent prevailed in this particular
instance. The Appellant asserts that only victory was obtained on 1 of 3 counts,
therefore he prevailed.
As previously indicated, counsel had conferred prior to the hearing that count
number 3 was being withdrawn. No evidence was produced relative to count 3. Again,
its rather clear that counts 1 and 2 while not actually pied in the alternative, were
intended to be in the alternative, and there is no indication that the Appellant was misled
in any fashion relative to the way count 1 and count 2 meshed. If there was any
question as to how the claim was presented a motion for more definite statements could
have been filed.
Based upon the foregoing, it is rather clear that Respondent prevailed.
Respondent is not the one filing this appeal, that is the Appellant. The Appellant lost.
The Appellant has a fine and a period of county jail time. The Respondent does not.
The Respondent prevailed.
Thereafter, the Appellant appears to make argument that the court made
numerous misstatements and referred to evidence that did not exist. One page 32 of
Appellant's Brief he refers to the fact that court stated:
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The Appellant thereafter states in parenthetical that he did not agree to plead
guilty to anything, in fact there was a trial. The Appellant is completely right, he did not
agree to plead to anything.
The Appellant set forth an extensive argument relative to whether his conduct
was willful or willfully done. That argument has been previously discussed on pages 1011 of this brief.

VIII.
Attorney Fees
Request for attorney fees in the first Appeal brief filed by a patiy is timely.

Tentinger v. McTheters, 123 Idaho 620, 977 P.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1999). This is the first
brief and accordingly is timely.
The thrust of Appellant's claim is simply that he disagrees with the Trial Court's
findings and requests this court to substitute its opinion rather than grant due deference
to the trial court.
The Appellant fails to understand or appreciate the dictates of Idaho Code §7610. That statute permits the court to exercise its discretion in awarding fees and costs.
The court inquired as to settlement negotiations in the case. The court was advised that
no agreement has been reached on any issues. See: October 4, 2014 transcript P5

L23 - P6 L21.
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were

that

it

were

an award to the prevailing party in a contempt

~~""''"'". It is
because the prevailing party

was entitled to do as they did, in this case lose visitation, and should not suffer a second
injury, attorney fees, for enforcing their rights.
Appellant is doing little more than asking the appellant court to substitute its
opinion for that of the trial court.

Such a request on appeal, results in an award of

attorney fees against the Appellant pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120, 12-121,
and Idaho Appellant Rule 41, Knowelton v. Mudd, 116 Idaho 262 775 P.2d 154 (Ct.

App. 1989). See also: Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 797 P.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1990);
Blaserv. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 829 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1991).
Additionally, the Appellant fails in this appeal to present any significant issue
regarding a question of law, no findings of fact made by the district court which are
clearly or arguably unsupported by substantial evidence, the court has not been asked
to establish any new legal standards or modify any existing standards, and the focus of
this appeal is the application of said law to the facts. In that situation an award of
attorney fees against the Appellant is appropriate.

Excel Leasing Company v.

Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 769 P.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1989)
Appellant has done little more than simply invite the Appellant Court to second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence.

The case law is well settled, if the

Appellant attacks the discretion of the trial court, and fails to show a misapplication of
the law, and no cogent challenge is presented to the exercise of discretion, attorney
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details,

in the

However, no meaningful issues relative to questions of law or application of discretion
were raised. Again, reasonable attorney fees on appeal is an appropriate award

T-

Craft Aero Club, Inc., v. Blough 102 Idaho 833 642 P.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1982).

IX.
Closing
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the Magistrate had ample evidence to
make a determination as to what a reasonable construction of the Decree of Divorce
was, and that Appellant is in contempt thereof. Further, the Magistrate's award of
attorney fees in that matter was justified and correct. The Magistrate exercised his
discretion, and kept within the bounds of reason, in the contempt finding. The
Magistrate did not exceed his discretionary boundaries by advising the parties that
future misconduct would not be permitted in issuing a sentence including incarceration
of the Appellant for such conduct
The District Court properly upheld the determination by the Magistrate Court,
even though on a different factual finding. It is important to note, that the factual find do
not conflict with each other, it is simply that the District Court Judge applied a term form
the Decree of Divorce, whereas the Magistrate applied an oral argument basis.
Additionally, the attorney fees awarded in the District Court, having not been appealed
should be upheld in the amount of $4,525.00.
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, should
in an
throughout this case, in faiiing

an

, based
his brief timely, in filing his brief in

improper format, and for merely asking the court to act as a new fact finder relative to
these issues. Attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code Section 1
120, 12-121, and Idaho Appellant Rule 41.
DATED this _ _day of June, 2016.

M. LYNN DUNLAP
Attorney for Respondent
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Robert Bickel
10671 W. Treeline Ct.
Boise, ID 83713
Idaho Court of Appeals
451 W State St
Boise, ID 83702
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